An adequate understanding of the phenomena of the psychoses remains elusive. This might seem a rather perplexing observation given strenuous research endeavours and a wealth of scientific information, particularly in recent years in the domains of molecular biology and neuro-imaging. A wide range of factors may be held to account for these limitations, one being that the brain is the most complex thing in the known universe, and should not be expected to yield its workings in much the same way as broken bones. Another is the enduring and profoundly mysterious gulf between observable neurobiological events and, for example, the experience of having thoughts inserted into one's brain, an enigma as much for philosophers as for psychiatrists.
Related to this is a problem that some might regard as among the most significant achievements of modern psychiatry, the ICD and DSM diagnostic systems.
These systems served to bring a degree of order into the confusion of psychiatric nosology, and strove to meet, at least to some extent, the criteria of reliability and objectivity in order for psychiatry to achieve its scientific aspirations. This advance has had a number of possibly unanticipated consequences. One is that certain diagnostic categories have become reified, whereby a tentative, hypothetical construct, having perhaps a degree of validity in the light of current knowledge, is endowed with an inappropriate and confining independent status, and possibly a more doubtful validity in the light of subsequent knowledge.
Another related consequence is the relative neglect of phenomenology. 1 The issue is complicated by the various meanings attached to the term. Broadly, and most familiar to clinicians, is the use of the term phenomenology in a merely descriptive sense, in identifying the symptoms and signs of mental illness. Phenomenology is also used to describe a methodology, in the rigorous account of a person's singular experience of the world, and in the context of philosophical phenomenology, the investigation of the nature of experience, as opposed to the objects of experience, of not merely how the world is perceived, but of being conscious in the world. 2 Clearly, within this range of meanings there is a tension between objective third-person accounts of mental states and subjective, first-person accounts, and in order to arrive at an adequate understanding of mental illness neither perspective can be disregarded.
Understanding psychotic phenomena must necessarily include the first-person account: neglecting this merely because it does not meet the criteria of scientific objectivity limits understanding and undermines scientific rigour. 3 In current practice there appears to be a gulf between diagnostic explanations and a sufficient understanding of the predicament of the individual in a specific personal and social context. 4 An adequate understanding of the phenomena of schizophrenia, for example, is lacking, and will require an integration of three levels: the neurobiological derangement, the aberrant cognitive processes at the psychological level, and the personal idiosyncratic experience of these processes. 5 Diagnostic explanations and meaningful understanding should not be considered dichotomous, but standard clinical practice and research programmes seem to disregard the need to integrate the two perspectives, both to foster an improved therapeutic alliance and also to clarify the neurobiological basis for more disease-specific symptoms.
A further concern of the 'tick-box' psychiatry engendered by these what at a neurobiological level might be described as noise, these endeavours need to be acknowledged rather than merely neglected and eliminated. Modulation of salience, limiting distress and enhancing the capacity to cope might be more appropriate goals of treatment than the suppression of experiences that are desperately real for those who suffer.
The fundamental pathophysiological deficits and the ultimate causes of the syndrome of schizophrenia remain unknown.
Looking beyond signs and symptoms and attending to the experience of psychosis, and linking this to observable psychological phenomena and neurobiological shifts, may yield more meaningful and productive results and more valid diagnostic constructs. First-and third-person perspectives need to be integrated if advances are to be made in the elucidation of these enigmatic phenomena. The reductive implementation of rigid scientific models has generated a bland and bleak depiction of the world of psychosis that does no justice to the extraordinary stories we are told.
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